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WILL THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT PREVENT A
POTENTIAL STATEWIDE AUTO INSURANCE CRISIS? THE
IMPACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IN
FISHER V. STATE FARM
EVAN STEPHENSON AND SHARI L. WALL†
On May 7, 2015, the Colorado Court of Appeals dramatically
changed how auto insurers must pay benefits under uninsured and
underinsured motorist (UIM) policies. In Fisher v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,1 the court interpreted two general insurancepenalty statutes enacted in 2008 to require every UIM insurer statewide
to operate effectively as a first-party health insurance operation.
After Fisher, UIM insurers must pay covered medical expenses
caused by auto accidents on a current basis, meaning as the bills accrue.
While requiring auto insurers to pay like a health insurer, Fisher offers
them none of the safeguards against runaway costs that health insurers
enjoy. Predictably, since Fisher, Colorado consumers have seen a
dramatic spike in auto insurance premiums and the return of the
inefficiencies that led to the repeal in 2003 of Colorado’s no-fault auto
insurance system—a legislatively designed piecemeal-payment system
for auto-accident medical costs.
The Colorado Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fisher.2 If
Fisher is affirmed, the premium spike will likely persist and contribute to
higher rates of uninsured motorists on Colorado roads. But if Fisher is
reversed and longstanding UIM law restored, the baleful effects of
Fisher may retreat.
I. WHAT IS UIM INSURANCE?
UIM insurance protects the insured against the risk that an at-fault
driver who has caused harm may have been “financially irresponsible”
and failed to carry adequate liability insurance to pay the insured’s
damages such a medical bills, lost wages, and non-economic damages.3
“This coverage is designed to place a driver who is injured by an
uninsured or underinsured motorist in the same position as if the
uninsured or underinsured motorist had liability limits in amounts equal
†
Evan Stephenson is a partner at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP. Mr. Stephenson focuses his
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1
No. 13CA2361, 2015 WL 2198515 (Colo. App. May 7, 2015), cert. granted, State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, No. 15SC472, 2016 WL 3207869 (Colo. June 6, 2016).
2
State Farm, 2016 WL 3207869, at *1.
3
Kral v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 784 P.2d 759, 765 (Colo. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 104-609 to -610 (2016).
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to the insured’s coverage.”4 UIM insurance allows the injured party to
make a claim against his or her own insurance company to receive the
same payment he or she would have recovered from the at-fault driver if
the driver had carried adequate liability insurance.5 The coverage is paid
when the insured proves liability and damages, in the same manner that
an injured party proves a tort case against an at-fault driver.6 Because
making a UIM claim involves proving up liability and damages to one’s
own insurer, UIM insurance necessarily causes the insurance company
and the insured to be adverse.7
UIM coverage is typically paid like liability insurance—all at once
pursuant to a settlement or judgment. In the Supreme Court’s words,
Colorado UIM coverage gives “Coloradans the opportunity to recover
compensation for losses from their UIM insurer ‘in the same manner’
and ‘to the same extent’ as they would recover for such losses from a
tortfeasor who was insured in amounts equal to the insured’s UIM
coverage.”8 Accordingly, UIM insurance policies commonly provide that
the insurance company will pay out the coverage as they do in liability
cases, meaning all at once under a settlement, judgment, or arbitration
award.9
In light of these considerations, insurance companies tend to equip
their UIM claim professionals with the same types of tools for claim
handling that they would provide to adjusters handling liability claims, as
opposed to the more elaborate medical-management apparatus employed
in health or workers-compensation insurance.

4
USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d 350, 358 (Colo. 2009); see also Sunahara v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 280 P.3d 649, 657 (Colo. 2012).
5
See Kral, 784 P.2d at 763–65.
6
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brekke, 105 P.3d 177, 187–88 (Colo. 2004) (noting that UIM
coverage “applies only if the insured is ‘legally entitled’ to damages” and “a finding of no liability or
of limited damages on the part of the uninsured motorist will eliminate or limit a claim under the
insurance provider’s UM coverage”); Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 487, 493
(Colo. 1998) (holding that the insured “has the burden to prove liability and damages”).
7
Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. App. 1992).
8
USAA, 200 P.3d at 353 (emphasis added); see also id. at 359 (noting that Colorado Supreme
Court precedent “has emphasized that the purpose of the UM/UIM statute is to provide Coloradans
with the opportunity to ‘gain compensation [within policy limits] for loss due to the negligent
conduct of non-insured motorists in the same manner as the insured would be compensated for loss
due to the negligent conduct of insured motorists’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Kral, 784 P.2d
at 762); id. (“[T]he legislature intended that an injured insured recover ‘in the same manner’ and ‘to
the same extent’ in either case.”) (quoting Kral, 784 P.2d at 763).
9
See, e.g., Williams v. Owners Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 914, 918 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting UIM
policy: “Whether an injured person is legally entitled to recover damages and the amount of such
damages shall be determined by an agreement between the injured person and us.”); Sidney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 187 P.3d 443, 449 (Alaska 2008) (quoting UIM policy: “[T]he right to benefits and
the amount payable will be decided by agreement between the insured person and Allstate. If an
agreement can’t be reached, the decision will be made by arbitration.”) (alteration in original).
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II. COLORADO’S EXPERIENCE WITH A NO-FAULT PIECEMEAL-PAYMENT
SYSTEM FOR PAYING MEDICAL COSTS FROM AUTO ACCIDENTS

Because UIM insurance is fault-based insurance that is typically
paid all at once under a settlement or a judgment, it fundamentally differs
from insurance coverage that pays as losses accrue, in a piecemeal
fashion. From 1974 to 2003, Colorado experimented with a no-fault
insurance system requiring payment of medical bills and other damages
from auto accidents as they accrued.10 Under Colorado’s No-Fault Act,
insurers were required to make periodic payments of medical bills
incurred as a result of car accidents in a piecemeal fashion.11
The no-fault piecemeal-payment system resulted in high premiums
and medical costs that decreased only after General Assembly repealed
the No-Fault Act in 2003.12 According to a February 18, 2008 study
prepared for the Colorado governor, the “average auto insurance
premiums in Colorado decreased 35 percent in the period July 2003 to
December 2007,” in the period following the repeal of the piecemealpayment system.13 In the last full year of that system in 2002, Colorado
had the ninth most expensive auto insurance in the U.S., but two years
after its repeal Colorado was ranked number twenty-one.14
Colorado’s experience with a piecemeal-payment system of medical
costs resembles the experiences of other states. A study by the RAND
Corporation of such systems concluded that their excessive cost is
“driven primarily by medical costs.”15 Auto insurers are poorly equipped
to control rising costs in a piecemeal-payment system that is essentially
“a first-party health-insurance operation.” 16 The result is runaway
medical expenses and, in turn, skyrocketing premiums: “Total injury
costs per insured vehicle gradually began to diverge across systems in
the late 1980s, with no-fault becoming substantially more expensive than
tort.”17 “Medical treatment in no-fault states was vastly more expensive
than in other states.”18 Claimants making piecemeal-payment claims saw
more, and more types of, medical providers, but even “the same medical
care costs more to the auto-insurance system in no-fault states than in tort
10
BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, AUTO INSURANCE/TRAUMA SYSTEM STUDY: STATE OF
COLORADO 1 (2008).
11
LaBerenz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Under § 10-4706(1)(b) of the No-Fault Act, insurers are required to pay reasonable and necessary expenses for
medical care performed within five years after an accident . . . . Under § 10-4-706(1) of the No-Fault
Act, an insurer has thirty days to pay benefits after receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount
of expenses incurred.”); 3 C.C.R. § 702-5:5-2-8(4)(B) (repealed 2016).
12
Miller v. Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 929 (Colo. App. 2009) (piecemeal-payment system repealed
in 2003); BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, supra note 11, at 1 (reduction in premium costs).
13
BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, supra note 11, at 5.
14
Id. at 7.
15
JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 143 (2010).
16
Id.
17
Id. at xv; id. at xvi (“No-fault’s high claim costs are the result of very high medical costs.”).
18
Id. at xv.
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states” that do not institute piecemeal-payment requirements.
Piecemeal-payment systems inflate medical costs.

19

In 2015, when Fisher was decided, Colorado had abandoned a
system of piecemeal-payment of medical costs arising from auto
accidents. Premiums had come down for a time, making insurance more
affordable in Colorado.
III. FISHER INTERPRETS THE 2008 PENALTY STATUTES TO REQUIRE UIM
POLICIES TO PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES AS THEY ACCRUE

In May 2015, Fisher judicially re-imposed a system of piecemealpayment of medical costs resulting from car accidents.20 To reinstitute a
piecemeal-payments regime, the court of appeals relied on two general
insurance-penalty statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and -1116
(Penalty Statutes), that were enacted and made effective in 2008.21
The Penalty Statutes provide that “[a] person engaged in the
business of insurance shall not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a
claim for benefits owed to or on behalf of any first-party claimant.”22 “If
a claim for payment of benefits has been unreasonably delayed or denied,
the claimant ‘may bring an action . . . to recover reasonable attorney fees
and court costs and two times the covered benefit.’”23
Although the statutes state unequivocally that the delay of a “claim”
may create liability, Fisher concluded that a penalty may be assessed
based on “a duty to pay some of the claim that is not reasonably in
dispute”24 including “one component of a UIM claim . . . .”25 To find
such a “duty to pay some” of a “claim,” 26 the court relied on the
“standard of reasonableness”27 from the Penalty Statutes, which consists
of one word (“unreasonably”), to conclude that that “under section 10-31115, State Farm was legally obligated to not unreasonably delay or deny
payment of [the insured’s] medical expenses, notwithstanding that other
components of his UIM claim may have been subject to reasonable
dispute.”28
The court of appeals further held that consumers and insurers
cannot opt out of the piecemeal-payment system in their insurance

19

Id.
Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13CA2361, 2015 WL 2198515, at *3–7 (Colo.
App. May 7, 2015).
21
Id.
22
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115(1)(a) (2016).
23
Fisher, 2015 WL 2198515, at *2 (quoting § 10-3-1116(1)).
24
Id. at *5.
25
Id. at *6.
26
Id. at *5.
27
Id. at *6.
28
Id. at *7.
20
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contracts. Any language attempting to opt out of the partial-payment
regime is “unenforceable.”29
Fisher did not simply require UIM insurers to make piecemeal
payments, it also prohibited them from relying on existing insurance
regulations for guidance. 30 The court of appeals required insurers to
operate a piecemeal-payment system but without the detailed regulations
and instructions necessary to operate such an inherently complex
compensation system. The court of appeals held that the word
“unreasonable” from the Penalty Statutes adequately guides insurers in
managing an ongoing piecemeal-payment system that must compensate
(i) insureds, (ii) lawyers, and (iii) healthcare providers, all of whom may
have competing claims or liens on insurance proceeds.
IV. THE MEDIA NOTICES A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN AUTO INSURANCE
PREMIUMS IN 2016 AND 2017
Not long after Fisher, Colorado auto insurance premiums began to
spike. The media noticed. “Who, What’s To Blame For Spiking Auto
Insurance Costs?,” asked a headline on June 20, 2016.31 These media
stories reported substantial increases that were greater than the increases
seen in traditionally high-cost insurance states such as California (7%
increase) and Florida (10% increase).32 In January 2017, more stories
appeared identifying still further substantial increases in six-month auto
insurance premiums.33
In media reports, some consumers called the increases
“[o]utrageous,” “unfair,” and “[o]ver the top.”34 Even low-risk drivers
who had received no traffic citations and been involved in no accidents
for years saw substantial premium increases. 35 Unfortunately, the
journalists who produced the stories did not interview legal experts to
determine the effect of legal changes on insurance rates. As a result, their
stories ignored the potentially powerful effect of legal rules on insurance
rates and premiums.36

29

Id. at *6 n.2.
Id. at *6.
31
Brian Maass, Who, What’s to Blame for Spiking Auto Insurance Costs?, CBS DENVER (June
20, 2016), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2016/06/20/spiking-auto-insurance-costs/.
32
Whitney Wild, Colorado Car Insurance Jumps 15% on Average, 9NEWS (June 21, 2016),
http://www.9news.com/money/personal-finance/consumer/colorado-car-insurance-jumps-15-onaverage/251394618.
33
E.g., Ashley Michels, Colorado Car Insurance Rates Increasing 15 Percent or More, FOX31
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://kdvr.com/2017/01/31/colorado-car-insurance-rates-increasing-15-or-more/.
34
Maass, supra note 32.
35
Id.
36
The effect of the law on premiums has been acknowledged by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Stresscon Corp., 370 P.3d 140, 144 (Colo. 2016) (noting that
legal rules governing insurers have “important practical implications for the risks that insurers
undertake and the premiums that insureds pay”); Craft v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 343 P.3d 951, 961
(Colo. 2015) (noting expansion of insurer obligations causes insurers to, “out of necessity, increase
their premiums”).
30
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V. DATA FROM DIVISION-OF-INSURANCE RATE FILINGS SHOWS A SPIKE
IN PREMIUM THAT COINCIDES WITH FISHER
Data from the Colorado Division of Insurance supports the
conclusion that Fisher is responsible for a premium spike. A search of
publicly available data from the Colorado Division of Insurance rate
filings from seven of Colorado’s largest auto insurers by market share
confirms a premium spike that coincides with Fisher. The authors
searched for UIM rate-increase data at the Colorado Division of
Insurance and located such data since Fisher for seven of the top ten auto
insurers by market share:
(i) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),
(ii) Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers),
(iii) American Family Mutual Insurance Company (AmFam),
(iv) GEICO Casualty Company (GEICO),
(v) Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate),
(vi) United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and
(vii) USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA CIC).
These auto insurers occupy 49.8% of the relevant insurance
market.37 Table 1 below sets forth these insurers’ publicly available data
for UIM rate increases since Fisher.
Table 1: Colorado UIM Rate Increases Since Fisher For Seven Large Insurers
(Source: Colorado Division of Insurance public rate filings)
Insurer Name
State Farm
Farmers
AmFam
GEICO
Allstate
USAA
USAA CIC

Date of Data
December 21, 2015
April 6, 2016
May 1, 2016
February 25, 2016
December 26, 2015
March 28, 2016
March 28, 2016
Average

Increase Since Fisher
15.00%
31.20%
6.50%
13.40%
17.50%
12.00%
30.00%
17.94%

The average of the Table 1 percentage-increase figures is 17.94%
over a period of fifteen months or less. Figure 1 below graphically
illustrates these UIM rate increases:

37

Division of Insurance Documents are on file with the Denver Law Review.
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An average increase of 17.94% (or 14.35% per year), held constant
over time, would cause UIM insurance rates to double in approximately
five years. These increases are alarming.
These data strongly indicate that the UIM increases did not result
from the general litigation or insurance climates in Colorado but rather
from UIM-specific changes in the last fifteen months. Only the impact of
Fisher credibly explains these increases. To test whether these increases
resulted from Fisher, the authors gathered from the Division of Insurance
post-Fisher data on the increase in overall auto insurance rates38 for the
same insurers from Table 1 over the same time period. Table 2 compares
the large increases in UIM rates to the much smaller increases in overall
auto insurance rates over the same period and for the same insurers.
Table 2: UIM versus Overall Auto Insurance Rate Increases Since Fisher
(Source: Colorado Division of Insurance public rate filings)
Insurer
Date of Data
Overall Auto
UIM
Difference
Name
Increase
Increase
State Farm
Dec. 21, 2015
5.10%
15.00%
9.90%
Farmers
April 6, 2016
8.09%
31.20%
23.11%
AmFam
May 1, 2016
4.00%
6.50%
2.50%
GEICO
Feb. 25, 2016
2.90%
13.40%
10.50%
Allstate
Dec. 26, 2015
9.90%
17.50%
7.60%
USAA
March 28, 2016
5.00%
12.00%
7.00%
USAA CIC
March 28, 2016
9.00%
30.00%
21.00%
Average
6.28%
17.94%
11.66%

As shown by Table 2 above, each and every one of the auto insurers
whose post-Fisher rates was determined based on public data had a
greater increase in UIM rates than overall auto rates. The overall auto
rates increased an average of only 6.28%, as compared to an average
38
“Overall auto rates” includes auto coverages other than UIM bodily injury coverage, such as
liability, collision, property-damage coverage, and so on.
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increase of 17.94% in UIM rates. Figure 2 below graphically illustrates
the rate data from Table 2.

As shown above in Figure 2 and Table 2, the difference between
overall auto and UIM rate increases since Fisher is large and striking—
an average difference of 11.66%. Thus, the difference between the
average UIM and general increases is itself almost double the average
size of the general increases. The magnitude of these differences points
to a UIM-specific cause in the last approximate fifteen months, and the
only credible explanation is Fisher. These data indicate that Fisher has
caused a dramatic UIM rate spike within a short time period.
Rate spikes, such as the one illustrated above in Tables 1 and 2 and
Figures 1 and 2, harm consumers and the entire insurance system on
which the public depends. Rate spikes increase the cost and
unavailability of insurance, and they destabilize the system at a basic
level. This is because the “more narrowly risk pools can be defined, the
more broadly insurance can be offered in the society.”39
VI. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING
FISHER
These data provide persuasive evidence that Fisher has already had
a baleful effect on the Colorado insurance market. There is no basis to
believe that the UIM rate spike that Colorado is currently experiencing
will spontaneously level off. It may grow worse, because, as explained
above, Fisher prohibits insurers and consumers from relying on

39
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1545 (1987).
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regulation or opting out. And Fisher does not provide UIM insurers with
the tools that other insurers have to control medical costs or otherwise
manage expenses. When rates increase in this manner, the number of
Coloradans unable to afford car insurance rises and the uninsured
motorist population expands, leading to greater instability in the auto
insurance marketplace.
The Colorado Supreme Court has accepted Fisher for certiorari
review. If the Supreme Court reverses, Colorado’s prior experience with
no-fault insurance teaches that the premium spike, and its other
consequences, can be reversed.

